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LOCKE V. DAVEY AND THE LOSE-LOSE
SCENARIO: WHAT DA VEY COULD
HAVE SAID, BUT DIDN'T
Frank S. Ravitch*

I.

INTRODUCTION

I first heard of Locke v. Davey' when it was percolating through the lower
courts. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, I had profoundly mixed
feelings about the case. On the one hand, Joshua Davey seemed to have a good
argument. He qualified for a generally available scholarship and was denied
solely because he wanted to use it to pursue a religious degree.3 This violated the
"Equal Access" principle,4 which I strongly believe in.
On the other hand, the Court had recently decided Zelman v. SimmonsHarris,5 a decision that seemed to be the final nail in the coffin for any serious

analysis of the effects of government funding programs under the Establishment
Clause.6 I have argued elsewhere that Zelman was an unprincipled (or wrongly
principled) decision,7 and the potential impact of Zelman is far reaching. Davey
presented an opportunity for a limiting principle on the seemingly boundless reach
of Zelman. As will be seen below, Zelman holds that aid programs are

* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.

1. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
2. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002).
3. Davey, 540 U.S. at 715-17.
4. Equal access is a term that has generally been associated with access by religious groups to
government facilities open to other groups as part of a public forum or limited public forum. See e.g.
Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that a Christian club cannot be denied
access to use classroom after school hours if other non-curriculum related groups are allowed to use
facilities); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that a
church group cannot be denied access to use school facilities to show movie on social issues from a
religious perspective if other groups are allowed to use facilities to address similar topics from other
perspectives); see also Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000) (holding that religious clubs cannot be
denied access to use school facilities during non-instructional time when other non-curriculum related
groups are allowed to use facilities). The term as used here would also include access by religious
individuals to funds under broad funding programs, which allow those individuals to use the funds at a
wide array of secular or religious private institutions. See infra nn. 10-12 and accompanying text. I
would not use the term to refer to funding in other contexts.
5. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
6. Id. at 687, 695-705 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
7. Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles,
Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 Ga. L. Rev. 489, 502-23 (2004).
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constitutional when government entities choose to fund them even where the bulk
of the monies flow to one or two religions, but Zelman does not answer the
question of whether the government must include religious entities when it
chooses to fund aid programs.8 Given the Zelman Court's reliance on "formal
neutrality," the latter possibility seemed and seems a distinct possibility. 9
The Court's approach in Zelman caused me to reconsider Davey. Without
Zelman, quite frankly, I would have thought that Davey should have received his
scholarship. My reasons would have been quite similar to those expressed by the
Court in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind"' and Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills School District'1-i.e., when government funds a truly broad

program that provides real choices to program recipients it may not discriminate
against religious recipients based on their religious choices."l

After Zelman,

however, a limiting principle on the formal neutrality doctrine is desirable-any
limiting principle! Davey presented such a possibility. The Court could have held
in Davey that government entities may fund programs that send dollars to
religious entities, but they are not required to do so even when a program is open

8. See generally Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
9. The possibility that religious entities would have to be included in generally available funding
programs is implicit in the holding in Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, even
though the outcome in that case was heavily dependent on the Free Speech Clause. 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (holding that a university that provides funding to a variety of student publications may not
exclude only religious publication because to do so would constitute viewpoint or content
discrimination). In fact, Davey argued that, given the facial neutrality and broad private choices
available under the Promise Scholarship Program, denying him the scholarship only because of his
religious intentions would be to discriminate based on religion. Davey, 540 U.S. at 717-18. He relied
on Rosenberger and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, among other cases. Lukumi,
508 U.S. 520 (1993) (finding that a city violated the Free Exercise Clause when it singled specific
religion out for disfavored treatment, but reasoning could apply to singling out religion more generally
for such treatment); see also Davey, 299 F.3d 748, 752-53, 755-56. The Ninth Circuit held that the state
violated Davey's rights under the Free Exercise Clause and violated the neutrality principle when it
denied him his scholarship because he decided to "pursue a degree in theology from a religious
perspective." Id. at 756-60. In Davey, the Supreme Court never addressed whether these same
arguments might be successful when the state denies a scholarship to a student because he or she wants
to use it at a religious school or for a religion major when a degree in devotional theology is not
involved. See 540 U.S. 712. Like the Court in Rosenberger and the Ninth Circuit in Davey, several
scholars have suggested that once government opens an aid program to recipients for a variety of
purposes or for use at a variety of entities on a neutral basis it cannot exclude only religious individuals
or pursuits. See Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution,
72 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 497-502 (2003) (arguing for nondiscrimination principle when government
allocates public funds); Robert William Gall, The PastShould Not Shackle the Present:The Revival of a
Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School Choice, 59 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 413, 426-27
(2003) ("Nothing in the First Amendment ... requires that a school choice program be enacted. But
once such a program is enacted, the state, or for that matter courts, cannot eliminate the ability of
participants to select religious schools solely because those schools are religious."); Richard W.
Garnett, Brown's Promise, Blaine's Legacy, 17 Const. Commentary 651, 665-69 (2000) (The Free
Exercise, Establishment, Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses require that when government
decides to enact a school choice program it may not exclude religious "choices, persons, or
institutions."); Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey's Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of Religious
Freedom, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 299, 335-37 (2003) (noting that Washington should not be able to
deny Davey his scholarship, when he was otherwise qualified under a broad and neutral government
funding program, simply because he chose to use his scholarship for religious purposes).
10. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
11. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
12. Id. at 10-11, 13-14; Witters, 474 U.S. at 483-84, 488-89.
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to a broad array of recipients. The Court in Davey, however, managed to deny
Davey his scholarship without creating any such limiting principle.
This article will explore how this result missed a golden opportunity to
define the boundaries of the Court's new formal neutrality doctrine. Part II will
provide a brief overview of Davey and Zelman. Part III will suggest that the result
in Davey was a lose-lose result, because no serious limiting principle on the formal
neutrality doctrine was created and a seemingly deserving student was denied a
scholarship solely because his chcsen profession was the clergy. Part IV will
explore the question of the so-called Blaine amendments in light of Davey.13 The
Court clearly held in Davey that the state constitutional provision involved in that
case was not a Blaine amendment. Still, the history of anti-Catholicism associated
with Blaine amendments remains important because that history points to a third
possibility regarding the formal neutrality doctrine, namely, that states may fund
programs that allow funds to flow to religious entities, but they need not do so
unless the reason for denying such funding involves a purpose to discriminate
against religion. This article concludes, however, that while the history of the
Blaine amendments is reprehensible, those amendments should not be presumed
unconstitutional without further analysis because they later came to serve noninvidious purposes.
II.

A.

OVERVIEW OF DAVEY AND ZELMAN

Davey

Davey is a decision quite limited in scope. It holds that states can decide not
to fund scholarships for those who wish to be trained in devotional theology, 14 and
that states which choose to fund such scholarships are free to do so. 5 This is
apparently the result of the "play in the joints, 16 between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The case involved a program in the state of Washington called the Promise
Scholarship Program.17 Students graduating from any high school in the state who
met certain academic and financial requirements were eligible for these
scholarships, which were worth $1,542 for the 2000-2001 academic year.1 8 Promise
13. Blaine amendments are state constitutional provisions modeled after a failed amendment to the
U.S. Constitution proposed by Senator James Blaine that would have banned funding to religious
schools. There is no doubt that the movement behind these amendments was highly influenced by
anti-Catholic, and to a lesser extent, anti-ecclesiastical sentiment. The Blaine amendments were
designed to discourage the growth of the Catholic school movement, which evolved in part as a
response to the Protestant domination of the common schools and ultimately the early public schools.
See Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 321-28, 335-42 (Harv. U. Press 2002) (explaining
that both before and after Senator Blaine's failed attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution to prohibit
any government funding of religious schools there was a strong movement that agreed with Senator
Blaine's proposal, and that movement was heavily influenced by anti-Catholic animus).
14. Davey, 540 U.S. at 724-25.
15. Id. at 718-19.
16. Id. at 719.
17. Id. at 715.
18. Id. at 716.
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scholars were free to use these scholarships for "postsecondary education
expenses" at any eligible college or university in the state of Washington, 9
including religiously affiliated schools.20 Students receiving Promise scholarships
were free to pursue a variety of majors including religion majors, but they were
not allowed to "pursue a degree in theology" while at an institution where the
Promise scholarship was being used. 2 ' Davey met the requirements and was
awarded a Promise scholarship, which he decided to use at Northwest College, a
22
college affiliated with the Assemblies of God, a Christian denomination. Davey
23
ministries.
pastoral
and
administration
decided to double major in business
When Davey refused to drop his major in pastoral ministries, he lost his Promise
Scholarship funding. 24
Davey claimed that the denial of his scholarship solely on the grounds that
he wanted to use it to train for the ministry violated his rights under the Free
Exercise Clause.25 The Ninth Circuit agreed.26 The Supreme Court held that the
play in the joints between the religion clauses allowed the state to protect its
citizens' freedom of conscience by denying funding to those who wished to use tax
dollars to train to become a member of the clergy.2 7 The Court cited a long history
of concern over state funding of the clergy going back to the time of the framers in28
support of its decision to allow the state to deny Davey his scholarship.
Interestingly, the Court did not hold that the Washington constitution's
establishment clause could effect federal Free Exercise Clause concerns, but
rather that there were no actionable free exercise concerns given the play in the
joints in the First Amendment."
The Court limited its holding to the question of whether states must fund
scholarships for those pursuing devotional theology degrees under a broad
funding program. 30 The Court did not say whether it would have been appropriate
for the state to exclude all religiously affiliated schools from the Promise
Scholarship Program, although the Court did cite the state's failure to do so as
evidence that the state policy regarding devotional theology degrees did not
evince hostility toward religion. 3' The opinion seems to carve out a small
exception to the formal neutrality doctrine, but it does not tell us what states are

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Davey, 540 U.S. at 715-16.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
Id. at 718.
Id.; Davey, 299 F.2d 748.
Davey, 540 U.S. at 719-23.
Id. at 721-23.
Id. at 720-21.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 724.
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free to exclude from
facially neutral funding programs besides training in
32
devotional theology.
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the state was discriminating against
Davey because of his religious convictions.3 a Justice Scalia's argument focused
heavily on the formal neutrality concept (although he doesn't call it that).3 4 He
would have held that once the Promise Scholarship Program was opened to a
variety of individuals to use for a variety of majors, the state was not free to
exclude only devotional theology from the list of majors Promise scholars could
35
pursue.
B.

Zelman

In Zelman, the Court upheld a voucher program in the Cleveland public
schools that allowed a disproportionate number of students to attend religious
36
schools. As will be discussed below, the Court upheld the program because it
was facially neutral and funds were distributed based on the38 private choices of
37
voucher recipients. This has been called "formal neutrality."
The Zelman Court claimed to follow the Agostini/Lemon test.3 9 The Court
pointed out that the voucher program did not present a secular purpose issue
because the goal of the program was to provide a better education to students in
the Cleveland Public School District.40 Of course, it is hard to imagine a situation
involving government aid for education or those in need where there would not be
an adequate secular purpose. Thus, the case centered on the effects of the
program. 41
The Court held that the voucher program involved "indirect aid" because
funds were allocated based on the choices of funding recipients, rather than as
grants directly to the religious schools. 42 Therefore, the Court looked to the
formal neutrality criteria: whether the program was neutral on its face and
whether the funding flowed to the religious institutions through individuals who
have "true individual choice" regarding where to direct the aid.43 Under the
Court's reasoning, however, there is not a significant distinction between direct
and indirect aid, because so long as the government entity drafting the program
relates the aid that flows to religious institutions to the number of individuals who

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See generally Davey, 540 U.S. 712.
Id. at 726-33 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 726-27, 731-33.
Id. at 726-32.
536 U.S. at 648, 662-63; id. at 687, 700-05 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 662-63 (majority).

38.

Ravitch, supra n. 7, at 490-513.

39. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-49; id. at 668-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
40. Id. at 649 (majority).
41.

Id.

42. Id. at 649-53.
43. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649-53, 662-63.
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choose to use the private service it does not matter if the check is written from the
government directly to the religious institution."
The data on the Cleveland voucher program was rather staggering. Most of
the private schools that accepted voucher students were religious schools and the
religious private schools generally had far more seats available for voucher
students than their secular counterparts. 45 Thus, it was not surprising that 96.6%
of voucher students attended religious schools. 6 Most parents effectively had no
choice among private school options, although-the Court suggested otherwise.47
In finding true private choice sufficient to uphold the program, the Court
went beyond the private school options the parents had, and included several
public school options. 48 These public school options included magnet schools and
charter schools.4 9 Thus, government-run programs became part of the field of
options the Court considered. This broadened the range of options parents
allegedly had and supported the notion that the voucher program provided true
private choice, despite the incredibly skewed statistics regarding private school
attendance under the voucher program.
Yet parents who chose to take
advantage of the voucher program because of dissatisfaction with all public school
options, or the inability to get into a magnet school or failure to win a lottery slot
at a community school,51 would have little choice but
to send their children to
52
religious schools or forego the voucher option entirely.
Under the reasoning in Zelman, the government-through the private
choice of students-could send massive amounts of money into the coffers of
religious schools.53 This would be so if schools representing only one or a few
religions are involved or if religions are put at a competitive disadvantage because
they do not have the numbers to take advantage of economies of scale.54 The
larger religions (or the religions with larger schools) in a given area can be the
primary beneficiaries of such programs without raising any serious constitutional
concerns.55 Thus, the formal neutrality approach would allow religious minorities
(the religious "have-nots") who don't want to be indoctrinated in alien faiths to be
left in the failing public schools, while the religious "haves" benefit from massive
government subsidies and educational opportunities. 6 This reasoning could

44. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 816 (2000) (plurality opinion).
45. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 703-04 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
46. Id. at 650 (majority) (stating 96%); id. at 703 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting) (stating 96.6%).
47. Id. at 653-54 (majority).
48. Id. at 658-60; id. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 664.
50. Id. at 653-56, 659-60; id. 663-64.
51. Ravitch, supra n. 7, at 521 (citing Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646); see Zelman, 536 U.S. at 703-04
(Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (noting that admission to community schools is
by lottery).
52. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 703-05 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
53. Id. at 703-04, 710-11; Ravitch, supra n. 7, at 513-23.
54. Ravitch, supra n. 7, at 518-19.
55. Id. at 522, 560-61.
56. Id. at 521-22, 560-61.
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readily be extended to a number of other government programs. Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer each filed strong dissenting opinions.
III.

WHY LOCKE V. DAVEY IS A LOSE-LOSE CASE

If the Davey Court had held that government entities need not fund
programs that allow money to flow to religious recipients, but may do so under the
Zelman formal neutrality doctrine, state and local governments could decide for
themselves whom to include in such funding programs. While this would not erase
the problems with the Zelman Court's reasoning, it would have created a limit on
Zelman's reach.58 On the other hand, if the Davey Court had allowed Davey to
keep his scholarship-because to exclude him from such a broad program based
solely on his religious motivations violates his free exercise rights-the result
would seem fair and appropriate given the circumstances.59 This result, however,
would have meant that government must allow funds to go to religious entities
and purposes so long as the relevant government program was facially neutral and
allowed true private choice. 60 The problem is that while this works well under the
facts in Davey,61 the reasoning would extend to situations like that in Zelman,
where there are few adequate private secular choices for recipients, but the Court
nonetheless finds true private choice. 61 Under the Zelman Court's formalistic
approach there is no difference between a truly broad program like those involved
in cases like Davey, Witters, and Zobrest, and one which has the primary effect of
advancing religion, 63 or even one that substantially facilitates religion. 64 This is
inherent in the Zelman Court's holding that when a program meets the formal
neutrality test there is no reason to consider actual effects under the effects test,
and its corollary holding that public institutions may be definitively considered in
determining whether recipients have true private choice, even when private
options are skewed toward religious institutions or even institutions of a specific
religion(s). 65
If one were to ask what effects Davey receiving his scholarship under the
Promise Scholarship Program would have, the answer would seem to be that6
Davey getting his scholarship poses little risk of primarily advancing religion.

57. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 686 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer,
JJ., dissenting); id. at 717 (Breyer, Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
58. This limitation would have been that inclusion of religious entities among the range of choices
in government funding programs is not required, even though it is allowed.
59. Compare Davey, 540 U.S. at 715-19 with Zobrest, 509 U.S. 1; Witters, 474 U.S. 481. Excluding
Davey under these circumstances would also probably violate the Establishment Clause because it
would disfavor religion.
60. See supra n. 9 and accompanying text.
61. Davey, 540 U.S. at 716-19.
62. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652-58; id. at 700-05, 707 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).
63. Ravitch, supra n. 7, at 513-23.
64. Id. at 560-63.
65. Id. at 513-23, 560-61.
66. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10-11, 13-14; Witters, 474 U.S. at 483-84, 488-89.
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Yet if this is so, what possible interest could the state have that would support
denying him the funding under such a broad .program? If Witters and Zobrest
meant what they said, it would seem that denying the scholarship solely on the
grounds that it would be used for religious training could raise serious free
exercise concerns, given that there is no federal Establishment Clause concern
that would justify the denial. Moreover, any concerns under a state establishment
clause would have to give way to federal free exercise concerns under the
Supremacy Clause. 67 This would be so regardless of Zelman. Denying Davey his
scholarship under these facts would tend to discourage religion, potentially in
violation of the federal Establishment Clause. 68
Yet Zelman makes this all quite problematic, because the Zelman Court
basically ignored the effects of the program involved in that case-a program that
seriously favored and funded religious entities. and involved few adequate secular
choices for program recipients.69 If Davey were entitled to his scholarship because
the Promise Scholarship Program was neutral on its-face and involved private
choice, 7° then states would need to include religious schools in voucher programs
and religious entities in other programs whenever the state creates a broad
funding program that is facially neutral and allocates funds based on the number
of recipients that use the relevant service.71 Under the rationale in Zelman, this
would be so even when the effect of the funding would be to favor one or two
denominations so long as the formal neutrality criteria is met.
Since public
entities could be counted among the relevant choices for recipients, there will
almost always be a secular choice.73 As I have pointed out elsewhere, formal
neutrality as practiced
by the Zelman Court involves quite a bit of formalism but
74
no neutrality.
Considering Davey without Zelman, it would seem that Davey should get his
scholarship because the state's denial of his scholarship violates his rights under
the Free Exercise Clause and maybe also the Establishment Clause. Add Zelman
to the picture though, and such a holding could be joined with the Court's new
formal neutrality approach to mandate that willing religious entities must be
included in all government programs open to a wide range of recipients if those
programs determine funding based on the number of people who use a given
program. This would be so even where it results in significant benefits to only one

67. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
68. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 218, 233 (1997) (holding that a primary effect of government action may
neither advance nor inhibit religion); see also Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1001-02 (1990) (advancing the
notion that government should neither encourage nor discourage religion).
69. Ravitch, supra n. 7, at 513-23.
70. Cf. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63 (holding that facial neutrality and private choice are adequate to
support government voucher program that allowed significant funds and students to go to religious
schools).
71. See supra n. 9 and accompanying text.
72. Ravitch, supra n. 7, at 518-23, 560-62.
73. Id. at 515-16.
74. Id. at 498-523.
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or two faiths and even when it helps support the core religious missions of such
entities.
The result in Davey is the worst possible one, because it failed to seriously
limit the formal neutrality principle and Davey did not get his scholarship. This
was a lose-lose outcome. Neither the nondiscrimination principle nor the
possibility of a limit on the formal neutrality doctrine was served.
As the law currently stands, government entities may create massive funding
programs that inure primarily to the benefit of religious schools (or other religious
entities) representing only one or two denominations. The schools (or other
entities) are allowed to proselytize their new state funded constituents. In fact,
they could require them to attend regular prayer services, even if the recipients
choose to use the religious entity only because of safety concerns or because it
happens to be the closest to their home. 75 This occurs-all in the name of
neutrality and choice-even when there is no real choice. Yet, under a program
where there really is a choice, a person like Davey may be denied the same
opportunity that all other recipients have, solely because his chosen vocation is
religious,76 even though the effect of such a choice would be minuscule when
compared to the massive benefits allocated to religion under Zelman.77
This is the world of formal neutrality and play in the joints. We ignore the
real world effects of a program when they benefit more established religions by
giving them a ready supply of recipients of other faiths or no faith at all to
proselytize, but blow these effects out of all proportion when a devoutly religious
person wants to pursue his or her calling at government expense when allowing
the funding under the relevant program would not seem to disproportionately
favor religion. Significantly, we still don't know the answer to the question of
whether government entities must allow religious entities to participate in broad
funding programs when funding recipients determine which entity to take their
government dollars to.78 Although, as is suggested above, the likely answer is that
government entities must do so. 79
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF BLAINE AMENDMENTS

It might seem odd to talk about the relevance of the so-called "Blaine"
amendments 8° in an article addressing Davey, because the Court stated rather
clearly that Washington's "Blaine" amendment was not relevant to that case.8 ' A

75. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 687, 704-07 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
76. Davey, 540 U.S. at 721-25.
77. Compare Davey, 540 U.S. at 715-17 (possibility that a few students might use scholarship to
train for ministry when there are many secular options), with Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644-47; id. at 700-05,
707 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (noting that there are thousands of students
and millions of dollars sent to religious schools under circumstances where there are few secular
private options).
78. See supra n. 9 and accompanying text.
79. See supra nn. 59-62 and accompanying text.
80. See supra n. 13 and accompanying text.
81. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n. 7.
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serious discussion of these amendments is beyond the scope of this article. Yet
Blaine amendments reflect a third possibility in funding cases, namely, that
government may fund programs that disproportionately benefit religion or a
specific religion under the formal neutrality principle, but need not do so unless
the motivation in not doing so is to disfavor religion or a specific religion. Of
course, such motivations may exist regardless of a Blaine amendment, but these
amendments have been pointed to as strong evidence of intent to disfavor religion
in state funding regimes.82
There is no doubt that the motivations of those who originally supported83
state Blaine amendments were heavily influenced by anti-Catholic animus.
Simply put, the original purpose behind the Blaine amendments was
discriminatory, 84 even if some of their supporters had "purer" motivations.85 This
does not answer the question of what impact this history should have today when
these amendments arguably serve several nondiscriminatory purposes.86 After all,
there are other laws and even state constitutional amendments that we take for
granted these days that were heavily motivated by bias against a particular
religious group. The most obvious of these are the anti-polygamy laws and state
constitutional provisions that were connected to extreme anti-Mormon bias.87 If
the history of the Blaine amendments renders them unconstitutional regardless of

any nondiscriminatory purposes they may currently serve, then surely the history
of the anti-polygamy laws would render them unconstitutional as well. 88

To

answer that there are many valid reasons today for anti-polygamy laws, but not for

82. See Gall, supra n. 9, at 415-24, 436-37 (using history of animus underlying Blaine amendments to
argue that they are invalid even if their discriminatory purpose has shifted from a particular sect to
religion generally); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers,
and the Next Round of ConstitutionalBattles, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 917, 967-69 (2003) (suggesting
that the animus argument may be the strongest in the arsenal of those trying to undermine the Blaine
amendments); Viteritti, supra n. 9, at 310-14, 323-25, 335-36 (pointing out anti-Catholic animus
underlying Blaine amendments and the relevance of that animus in evaluating those amendments in
modern opinions).
83. Hamburger, supra n. 13, at 324-28, 335-36, 338-42.
84. Id.; but see Steven K. Green, "Blaming Blaine": Understandingthe Blaine Amendment and the
"No-Funding" Principle,2 First Amend. L. Rev. 107 (2003) (arguing that the Blaine amendments and
state "baby Blaines" were not motivated solely by anti-Catholic animus, as a number of
nondiscriminatory factors also motivated the no-funding amendments).
85. By "purer" motivations I am referring to the broadly anti-ecclesiastical strivings of groups like
the National Liberal League. These people were a small minority, however, compared to the antiCatholic bigots involved in the Blaine Amendments. Hamburger, supra n. 13, at 312-28 (addressing
the general roles of the anti-ecclesiastical "Liberals" and the anti-Catholic nativists around the time of
the original "Blaine" amendment). I use the term "purer" motivations because these people were
against state support of religion generally rather than targeting only Catholics.
86. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 Emory
L.J. 43, 50-53, 58, 73-74 (1997) (acknowledging the discriminatory history of the Blaine amendments,
but suggesting that while we should not "reason from a premise rooted" in "anti-Catholicism," we
should think about religious freedom questions "afresh," and suggesting justifications for a limited
separationist approach).
87. See Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional
ProhibitionsAgainst Polygamy are UnconstitutionalUnder the Free Exercise Clause, 17 Ga. St. Univ. L.
Rev. 691, 710-20 (2001) (noting anti-Mormon bias underlying the anti-polygamy laws and the Supreme
Court's decisions relating to those laws).
88. See generally id. (suggesting the anti-polygamy laws violate the Free Exercise Clause).
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laws denying state funding to religious entities, is simply to beg the question
whether there are valid reasons for the latter, which is a hotly contested issue.89
Therefore, we must consider whether the history of the Blaine amendments
is relevant to their current constitutional status, and if so, why? If this history is
relevant and determinative, the state Blaine amendments are surely
unconstitutional and would violate both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause. If this history is not relevant, or even if relevant but not
determinative, we must look to the purposes these amendments currently serve to
determine whether they are constitutional given their disparate impact on
religious entities. 9° At the heart of this latter inquiry is the question of whether
separationist principles are appropriate in the funding context. The formal
neutrality approach would seem to answer "no," 91 but is this correct?

Answering this highly complex and important question is beyond the scope
of this article, but the answer would be relevant in determining how far the third
option goes. After all, if the Blaine amendments are constitutional, the "unless"
in the third option-government entities may, but need not, allow substantial aid
to flow to religious entities unless the motivation in not doing so is to disfavor
religion or a specific religion-cannot be met simply because the state has denied
funding based on a Blaine amendment. Thus, the facts and policies surrounding a
specific denial of funding would be relevant to any claim challenging that denial.
If the Blaine amendments are unconstitutional because of their original purpose,
the "unless" is met every time the state acts pursuant to a Blaine amendment to
deny funding to a religious entity. Unless the Supreme Court decides to rely upon
the original purpose of the Blaine amendments when confronted with an
appropriate case-reasoning that would also implicate anti-polygamy and other
laws-the Court will at some point have to answer whether separationist
principles are valid reasons for the denial of aid when the dictates of formal
neutrality are met.
V.

CONCLUSION

Locke v. Davey presented a golden opportunity to define the boundaries of
the Court's new "formal neutrality" doctrine. The Court could have held that
states are not required to allow state funds to be spent at religious institutions or
for religious purposes, even under a facially neutral program that determines

89. Laycock, supra n. 86; Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 82, at 957-72; see also Steven K. Green, Of
(Un)EqualJurisprudentialPedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality and Separationism,43
B.C. L. Rev. 1111 (2002) (arguing that separationist objections to state funding that reaches religious
institutions are valid and historically grounded).
90. Cf.Freethought Socy. of Greater Phila. v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 262 (3rd Cir. 2003)
(holding that County's reasons for not removing Ten Commandments plaque from county courthouse
in 2001, rather than the reason why it was placed on the courthouse in 1920, is the relevant inquiry for
purposes of analyzing the constitutionality of the plaque).

91. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 687-96, 715-17 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's formal neutrality approach has abandoned the principles underlying Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and is contrary to a number of other cases that rely on
separationist principles).
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where to allocate funds through the private choices of funding recipients. While
this would have had the effect of denying Davey his scholarship, which would have
been unfortunate under the facts in Davey, it would have placed a limit on the
formal neutrality doctrine as applied by the court in Zelman. Even if the Court
had held that the state must fund recipients who choose to use their state allocated
funds at religious institutions or for religious purposes so long as the program
meets the requirements of formal neutrality, state and local government entities
would have had an answer to the question of whether they can exclude religious
entities or purposes from such funding programs.
Instead, the Court handed down a very narrow decision in which Davey was
denied his scholarship because he wanted to use it for devotional theology-a
subject states can exclude under Davey-and no answer was forthcoming
regarding the broader question of whether states must allow funds to flow to
religious entities under the Zelman doctrine. The irony of this holding is that
unlike the parents who sued in Zelman, recipients under Washington's Promise
Scholarship Program really did have a wide array of choices, both public and
private, from which to choose. Thus, the effect of Davey using his scholarship in
the manner he wanted to would benefit religion far less than the disproportionate
and significant amount of money and new students the religious schools received
in Zelman. Welcome to the world of formal neutrality!
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